sexta-feira, março 04, 2005

Born again

Enquanto a Europa permanece manietada por um laicismo militante, herdeiro da pior tradição francesa, do outro lado do Atlântico a ligação entre religião e política é cada vez mais estreita, enterradas que estão as divagações da década de 60.

Nos EUA, os dois pares desta saudável equação resultam numa sociedade livre, pluralista e responsável que, por isso mesmo, não está disposta a abdicar dos seus valores estruturantes em troca de uma qualquer deriva niilista.

Seja por convicção íntima, seja pela simples constatação sociológica dos benefícios que a vivência religiosa aporta a qualquer comunidade adulta, inúmeros analistas (desde Tocqueville a Himmelfarb) não se cansam de assinalar quanto a sociedade americana deve à matriz judaico-cristã.

Onde encontrar a raiz deste redespertar? Em primeiro lugar, na experiência individual da metanoia (suposta ou real, mas de qualquer maneira vivida). De facto, para Michael Medved “one of the things that most irreligious or non religious Americans don’t recognize sufficiently is that a huge theme of American religiosity, both Christian and Jewish, is that the individual goes through a rebirth, a recommitment, a return. That kind of transforming religious experience is usually associated with a more conservative political outlook. This is one of many things that the secularists don’t get—the President’s “I once was lost, but now I’m found. I once was blind , but now I see.” This is the core story of American Christianity, the story of being born again, of having a new life, of coming home, of the prodigal son “.

Emergência dos Teocons

Mas o papel proeminente que a religião tem vindo a assumir nos EUA deve-se também a uma reacção vigorosa ao secularismo radical que assolou o país há algumas décadas.

Traçando o desenvolvimento do teoconservadorismo, Irving Kristol nota que “the active religion-based conservatism did not become a political force in the United States because of either religion or conservatism. Its activism was provoked by militant liberalism and the militant secularism associated with it. This liberalism and this secularism, in the postwar years, came to dominate the Democratic party, the educational establishment, the media, the law schools, the judiciary, the major schools of divinity, the bishops of the Catholic Church, and the bureaucracies of the "mainline" Protestant denominations. One day, so to speak, millions of American Christians–most of them, as it happens, registered Democrats–came to the realization that they were institutionally isolated and impotent. They quite naturally wanted their children to be raised as well-behaved Christians but discovered that their authority over their own children had been subverted and usurped by an aggressive, secular liberalism that now dominated our public education system and our popular culture. They looked at our high schools and saw that gay and lesbian organizations were free to distribute their literature to the students but that religious organizations were not. They saw condoms being distributed to adolescent teenagers while the Supreme Court forbade the posting of the Ten Commandments on the classroom wall. And so they rebelled and did the only thing left for them to do–they began to organize politically. In so doing they may very well have initiated a sea-change in American politics and American life."

Pode-se perguntar se a mesma reacção não ocorrerá na Europa a médio prazo? É certo que a prática religiosa tem vindo a declinar no Velho Continente, mas o caso Butiglione, os dislates de Zapatero e a agenda anti – valores tradiconais de algumas franjas do PS, devidamente enquadras por um Bloco de Esquerda com os dentes de fora, não implicarão um lógico rebater da onda jacobina, do qual o recente caso do Padre Serras Pereira é já um radical prenúncio?

ON